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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to build a systematic analysis of financial liberalization. An integrated 
model of portfolio decision-making and consumption-saving decision is presented in order to detect 
the effect of financial liberalization on the supply of credit to the private sector. Moreover, the 
crowding out of the private sector credit by the Lebanese government sector is illustrated through 
the identification of the gap between the demand for money of the public and private sectors.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he restriction of loans to a few large borrowers, together with the widespread existence of high 
inflation, growing budget deficit, and reduced real interest rates, led to a serious Lebanese credit 
crunch since 1994. The present recession is exposing the frailty of the Lebanese commercial banks’ 
loans:  the loan-loss reserve to total assets and the delinquency rates are increasing since 1998. With reduced real 
interest rates on savings deposits and expectations of continued inflation, it is not surprising that few individuals are 
willing to save.  
 
In addition, the Lebanese commercial banks are subject to numerous lending restrictions and are facing 
“disguised” mandatory interest rate ceilings on loanable funds. These artificial interest rates are often set by the 
Lebanese government always seeking to finance its budget deficit through the sale of bonds to commercial banks. 
Consequently, these banks had to resort to rationing the available credit, where the demand for loanable funds greatly 
exceeds the available supply - a phenomenon known as financial repression
1
 because investment in Lebanon is 
repressed by a shortage of savings, which in turn results from administered real interest rates
2
. In the absence of 
outright corruption in the allocation of loanable funds, most commercial banks choose to allocate the available credit 
to a few large borrowers so as to minimize their “burden3”.  Hence, small farmers and urban entrepreneurs have no 
recourse but to seek finance from the unorganized money market, where they are willing to pay above –market-
clearing rates
4
.  
 
One suggested solution to this problem is to liberalize the financial sector by allowing nominal interest rates 
to reach the market-clearing-levels. This would cause real interest rates to increase and thus remove the explicit 
interest rate subsidy accorded to preferred borrowers who are powerful enough to have access to the “rationed credit” 
                                                 
1
 This is in addition to the changes in the reserve requirements.  
2
 Usually set at below market-clearing levels. 
3
 Where “burden” represents the net noninterest income. 
4
 Naimy V. (2004), “Financing Problems Faced By The Lebanese SMEs: An Empirical Study”. The International 
Business And Economics Research Journal, Volume 3, Number 1, January, p. 27-38 
T 
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and should generate more domestic savings and investment. However, evidence of the effects of financial reform on 
savings and investment may reveal shortcomings on the process
5
.  
 
As no academic work measuring the effects of financial liberalization on the supply of credit to the private 
sector has been done in Lebanon, this paper tries to fill this gap by using an integrated model of portfolio selection and 
consumption-saving. The particularity of this model resides in the fact that it incorporates simultaneously the role of 
wealth effects, portfolio changes effects, and the crowding out effects. Moreover, based on Gupta K. and Lensink R. 
(1996)
6
 works, we consider the government budget deficit as endogenous in order to better illustrate the effects of 
interest rate deregulation on government expenditures, revenues, and interest payment. Then, and within the context of 
the Lebanese financial system, we try to apply this model using a variety of assumptions in order to carry out some 
relevant conclusions related to the crowding out effects.  
 
BUILDING THE MODEL 
 
Conceptual Issues 
 
The seminal works of McKinnon (1973)
7
 and Shaw (1973)
8
 predict that interest rate controls and directed 
credit programs impede the process of deepening. In contrast, there is a small but growing literature which emphasizes 
financial market imperfections, including asymmetric information and imperfect competition (Stiglitz (1994)
9
, Caprio 
(1994)
10
, Gertler and Rose (1996)
11
, Hellmann et al. (1996 a,b, 2000)
12
.  Besides these macroeconomics approaches, 
there are also models belonging to the literature on banking that investigate the effects of financial regulation on risk 
taking by banks (Kim and Santomero (1988)
13
, Keely and Furlong (1990)
14
, and Gennote and Pyle (1991)
15
. Recently, 
the empirical literature on the effects of financial policies has been growing rapidly. Most of the macro-econometric 
studies focus on a number of Asian Economies and show that the effects of financial restraints may be very large but 
                                                 
5
 Such as the case of Chile during the 1970s where the acquisition of numerous banks by large conglomerates, or 
grupos, occurred. These grupos used their financial resources to buy recently privatized firms or to expand their 
companies. When many of their firms faced financial losses, these grupos had to resort to additional funding to avoid 
bankruptcy. Hence the Chilean financial system was very vulnerable when the debt crisis struck in the 1980s. 
6
 Gupta K. and Lensink R. (1996). “Financial Liberalization and Investment”, Routledge Studies in Development 
Economics, British Library cataloguing in Publication Data.  
7
 McKinnon R., (1973).  Money and Capital in Economic Development. Brookings Institution, Washington DC.  
8
 Shaw E., (1973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development. Oxford University Press, New York. 
9
 Stiglitz JE. (1994). “The Role of the State in Financial Markets.” Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference 
on Development Economics 1993, 19-52. 
10
 Caprio G. (1994). “Banking on Financial Reform? A case of Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions.” In 
Financial Reform: Theory and Experience, Caprio G, Atiyas I., Hanson J. (eds). Cambridge University Press. Without 
the work of Gupta K. and Lensink R., the theoretical part of this research would have been impossible and would have 
taken years of work.  
11
 Gertler M., Rose A (1996). “Finance, Public Policy and Growth”. In Financial Reform: Theory and Experience, 
Caprio G, Atiyas I., Hanson J. (eds). Cambridge University Press. 
12
 Hellman T., Murdock K., Stiglitz JE., (1996a). “Financial Restraint: Toward A New Paradigm”. In The Role Of 
Government In East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Aoki M., Okuno-Fujiwara 
M., Kim H (eds). Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
Hellman T., Murdock K., Stiglitz JE., (1996b). “Deposit Mobilisation Through Financial Restraint”..In Financial 
Development and Economic Growth, Hermes N., Lensink R (eds). Routlege: London.  
Hellman T., Murdock K., Stiglitz JE., (2000). “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: 
Are Capital Requirements Enough?” American Economic Review 90: 147-165 
13
 Kim  D and Santomero A., (1998). “Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation”. The Journal of Finance XLIII:1219-
1233 
14
 Keely M., and Furlong F., (1990). “A reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation”. 
Journal Of Banking and Finance 14: 69-84. 
15
 Gennote  G., and Pyle D., (1991). “Capital Controls and Bank Risk”. Journal of Banking and Finance 15:805-824. 
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vary considerably across countries
16
. Cross-country growth regressions indicate that financial restraints
17
 may hamper 
financial development (Rossi 1999)
18
.  
 
The Model 
 
This model, based on the work of Gupta K. and Lensink R. (1996)
19
, considers a private sector (PS), a 
banking sector including the central bank (CB) and the private banks (PB), a government sector (GS), and an external 
sector (ES). The supply side related to the ES is ignored in our study. This model highlights the implications of the 
consumption-saving decision and the portfolio allocation decision where both are jointly determined. Table 1 
illustrates the structure of the model. 
 
Table 1:  Structure of the Model 
 1. PS 2. CB 3. PB 4. GS 5. ES Total 
Non-financial  transactions  Cp + k – (y -T)   Cg + Ig - T NE
20 0 
Bonds b   -b  0 
Deposits m  -m    
Foreign Assets f   -A -f + A 0 
Loans -Lp Lg-R Lp + R -Lg  0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
The Private Sector (PS) 
 
This consolidated
21
 sector is constituted of firms and households. This consolidation may suffer from certain 
shortcomings. For example, it would be interesting to see if the crowding out effects are confined to households or to 
firms. If the crowding out effects are confined to firms, investment will be affected not only from the demand side but 
also from the supply side
22
. However, disaggregating this sector requires the set up of a very complicated mechanism 
that distributes this effect on the two components which is impossible to apply for the Lebanese case. It’s worth 
mentioning that the choice of consolidating this sector is justified by the purpose of this study which is to illustrate 
and measure the effects of the public debt (the government borrowing from the banking sector) and its crowding out 
effects.  
 
The budget constraint of this sector is given by column 1 of table 1: 
 
y - T+ Lp = yd + Lp = Cp +m+k+ b+f.                      (1) 
                                                 
16
 Demetriades P., and Luintel K., (1997). “The Direct Cost of Financial Repression: Evidence from India”. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 106: 359-374 
17
 With perhaps the exception of controls on capital outflows.  
18
 Rossi M., (1999). “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance in Developing Economies – Do Capital Controls, 
Prudential Regulation, and Supervision Matter?” IMF Working Paper, WP/99/66, International Monetary Fund: 
Washington, DC. 
19
 P. 11-21 
20
 NE stands for net exports 
21
 The issue of consolidation is very meticulous. Depending on the purpose of the research, one may argue that the 
disaggregation of the consolidated sector into its components would be more desirable as suggested by Bourguignon 
et al. (1992) in their study of the effects of structural adjustment programs on income distribution where they imposed 
restrictions that cannot be applied in our study. For example, they assume that households are not liquidity constrained 
and that not only is the consumption-saving decision independent of the portfolio selection decision, but that the latter 
is also sequential in terms of the liquidity of the assets.  
Bourguignon F., Branson W.H., et De Melo J., (1992). “Adjustment and Income Distribution: A Micro-Macro Model 
for Counterfactual Analysis.” Journal of Development Economics, 38: 17-39 
22
 Please refer to the simulation results of Gupta K. and Lensink R. (1996), chapter 7.  
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The variables constituting the portfolio represent four assets: 
 
bank deposits: m 
real government bonds: b 
real physical capital: k 
inflation hedge where foreign assets are represented by f and denominated in domestic currency. 
Cp represents real private consumption, 
Lp stands for real private credit, 
y for real GDP 
T for taxes, and 
yd for real disposable income assumed to be exogenous
23
.  
 
With respect to Barro (1984)
24
, the model considers that investment takes place in this sector and thus 
justifies the budget constraint.  Based on Gupta K. (1996) work, the behavioral equations for the private sector are 
presented as follows:  
 
m = 1yd + 2W + 3Lp + 4im - 5ik - 6ib - 7if - 8 
e       
           (2) 
k = 11yd + 12W + 13Lp - 14 im + 15ik - 16ib - 17if - 18
e                        
(3) 
b = 21yd + 22W + 23Lp - 24im - 25ik + 26ib - 27if - 28
e                        
(4) 
f = 31yd + 32W + 33Lp - 34im - 35ik - 36ib + 37if - 38
e                         
(5) 
Cp = 41yd + 43Lp - 44im - 45ik - 46ib - 47if - 48 
e                         
(6) 
Sp= yd - Cp                       (7) 
W = W-1 + Sp                       (8) 
 
im, ik, ib, and if  are the exogenous nominal rates of return on deposits, physical capital, government bonds, and foreign 
assets respectively.  
 
Sp = real private savings,  
W = real private wealth, 
e = exogenous expected rate of inflation.  
 
Using the taxonomy introduced by Brillembourg (1978)
25
, we differentiate three possible reactions to 
portfolio disequilibrium which would be caused by the liberalization of interest rates leading to excess demand for 
bank deposits. 
 
 a reallocation of the existing portfolio, 
 a reallocation of a given aggregate of savings by changing the menu of assets, and 
 a change in the aggregate flow of savings which, assuming that bank deposits are a normal good,  will 
increase their demand.  
 
                                                 
23
 Real disposable income equals y minus taxes plus net interest receipts. For simplicity we ignore net interest receipts 
since an increase in the deposit rate normally leads to an increase in the lending rate which affects net interest receipts 
in opposite directions. In this model we assume that real non-interest income is not influenced by changes in the 
deposit rate. This assumption is the result of the not taking into consideration the supply side. This implies that real 
disposable income is exogenous and hence not influenced by changes in the deposit rate.  
Morisset J., (1993). “Does Financial Liberalization Really Improve Private Investment in Developing Countries?” 
Journal of Developing Economics, 40:133-150.   
24
 Barro R., (1984). Macroeconomics, Wiley, New York. 
25
 Brillembourg A., (1978). “The Role of Savings in Flow Demand for Money: Alternative Partial Adjustment 
Models.” Staff Paper FMI, 25:278-292. 
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In this model, only reactions 1 and 3 are incorporated. For this purpose, and based on the model of Owen 
(1981)
26
, which is based on the works of Brainard and Tobin (1968)
27
, Smith (1978)
28
, and Pissarides (1978)
29
, we use 
the integrated model of portfolio selection and consumption-saving decisions.   
 
The justification of the behavioral equations is illustrated in table 2.  
 
 
Table 2 
Equations’ 
identification 
Justification Reference Coefficients’ Sign 
2,3, 4 and 5: 
Asset demand 
equations30 
Derived from using the multivariate 
adjustment function where changes in 
wealth (W) enter as a separate explanatory 
variable, which allows us to incorporate 1 
and 2 defined above. 
Brainard and 
Tobin (1968) 
Coefficients of disposable income and wealth 
are positive in each case31.  The coefficients of 
Lp are also positive.  The asset demands are 
assumed to be positively affected by the own 
rates of return and negatively by the 
alternative one, implying that the assets are 
gross substitutes.  
6: The 
consumption 
function 
Does not include wealth32 or lagged 
values33 of the various assets. 
Owen (1981) It is assumed that 0 < 41 < 1 and 43 >0.   
With respect to the interest rates, it is assumed 
that the negative substitution effect exceeds 
the positive income effect.  
Why Lp 
appears in 
2,3,4, 5,&6? 
Lp represents liquidity constraints for 
firms and households34.  Lp is treated as 
being exogenous to the private sector. 
Fazzari S. et 
al., (1988)35 
p. 163.  
 
7: Savings yd is exogenously given   
8: Private 
wealth 
   
                                                 
26
 Owen P.D., (1981). “Dynamic Models of Portfolio Behavior: A General Integrated Model of Incorporating 
Sequential Effects”. American Economic Review, 71:231-238. 
27
 Brainard W.C., et Tobin J., (1968). “Pitfalls in Financial Model Building” American Economic Review, 58: 99-122. 
28
 Smith G., (1978). “Dynamic Models of Portfolio Behavior: Comment on Purvis.” American Economic Review, 
68:410-416.  
29
 Pissarides C.A., (1978). “Liquidity Considerations in the theory of Consumption.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
93: 279-296.  
30
 These equations do not include the lagged values of the various assets as specified in the Brainard-Tobin 
framework, because this model does not depend on their inclusion. We have excluded them for convenience. It should 
be noted that their inclusion becomes necessary in case of simulation because the time-path of endogenous variables 
depends on their presence.   
31
 Implying that all assets are normal goods. 
32
 According to Owen (1981), the exclusion of wealth is assumed based on the fact that the “end of period wealth” is a 
consequence of the consumption-saving decision and not a determinant of it.  
33
 The exclusion of the lagged asset terms, although present in the Owen model, is justified for the same reasons as in 
the asset equation. 
34
 There is considerable evidence that households face such constraints in developing countries caused by the presence 
of inefficient credit markets (Rosenzweig M. R., et Wolpin K.I., (1993)).  
The presence of the credit variable in the consumption equation is meant to capture the role of such market 
imperfections (Jappelli T. et Pagano M., (1994)). 
Rosenzweig M. R., and Wolpin K.I., (1993). “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing and the 
Accumulation of Durable Production, Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investment in Bullocks in India.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 101(2):223-244. 
Jappelli T. et Pagano M., (1994). “Savings, Growth and Liquidity Constraints.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109(1) : 83-109 
35
 Fazzari S. M., Hubbard R.G., and Peterson B.C., (1988). “ Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment.” 
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, (19): 141-195. 
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The next step is to derive the adding-up restrictions of the above sub-model. It can be shown that (1) is 
satisfied if and only if the following holds:  
 
(1 + 11 + 21 + 31) + 41(1- 2 - 12 - 22 - 32)+ (2 + 12 + 22 + 32) = 1                (9a) 
(3 + 13 + 23 + 33) + 43(1 - 2 - 12 - 22 - 32) = 1                 (9b) 
(4 - 14 - 24 - 34)    - 44(1 - 2 - 12 - 22 - 32) = 0                 (9c) 
(-5 + 15 - 25 - 35)  - 45(1 - 2 - 12 - 22 - 32) = 0                 (9d) 
(-6 - 16 + 26 - 36)   - 46(1 - 2  - 12  - 22- 32) = 0                 (9e) 
(-7  - 17 - 27 - 37)   - 47(1 - 2 - 12 - 22 - 32) = 0                 (9f) 
(-8 - 18 - 28 - 38)   - 48(1 - 2 - 12 - 22 - 32) = 0                 (9g) 
 
The symmetry restrictions require that: 
 
5 = 14 
6  = 24 
7 = 34                      (9h) 
16 = 25 
17 = 35 
27 = 36 
 
The Banking Sector (BS) 
 
The central bank and the commercial banks are consolidated into a single sector. The budget constraint can 
be derived from consolidating column 2 and 3 in table 1 as follows: 
 
Lp + Lg = m                     (10) 
 
Lg denotes bank credit for the government sector
36
. Given Lg and m, the supply of credit to the private sector is 
residually determined. There is no equation for the demand for loans from the private sector since it is assumed that 
this sector is credit constrained
37
.  
 
Equation 10 illustrates how the McKinnon-Shaw mechanism would work.  Assume that Lg remains constant 
and that the demand for deposits (m) goes up in response to liberalization of interest rate on deposits. This would 
mean an increase in credit to the private sector. Since 13 >0 (in equation 3), this would mean an increase in private 
investment. In other word, a given increase in im would lead to an increase in the demand for m as well as k, thus 
confirming the “complementarity” hypothesis.  
 
The Government Sector (GS) 
 
The government budget constraint
38
 is given in column 4 of table 1 as follows: 
 
Cg + Ig – T = DEF = Lg +b + A                   (11) 
Cg = government consumption 
Ig = government investment 
A = foreign aid 
DEF = government deficit 
                                                 
36
 Net interest receipts are ignored (the change in real bank profits) since, according to Morisset (1993), the change in 
real bank profits is not influenced by changes in the deposit rate.  
37
 That’s why it is treated as being exogenous in the private sector’s budget constraint.  
38
 This budget constraint says that a given deficit is financed by borrowing from the banking sector and/or by selling 
bonds to the non-bank private sector and/or by foreign aid.  
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It is assumed that a change in the deposit rate does not affect government deficit. Hence, we consider 
government expenditures and taxes to be exogenous. Foreign aid is also assumed to be exogenous. 
 
A one dollar reduction in the demand for government bonds, given A, means a one dollar increase in the 
government borrowing from the banking sector. The increase in government borrowing from the banking sector is 
determined by the budget constraint of this sector. This explains how a crowding out of the private sector credit may 
occur if the government
39
 has to borrow from the banking sector.  
 
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ON THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT TO THE LEBANESE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
Overview Of The Lebanese Economic Situation 
 
Table 3 shows some basic data for the Lebanese economy for the years 1991 to 2000.  Nominal GDP (in 
US$) grew at annual average rate of 12 percent over this period but inflation cut real growth considerably to 4.2 
percent per annum (excluding 1991).  During 2000, although the inflation rate was down to zero percent (from 120 
percent in 1992), real GDP growth also was zero percent.  During the 1990s and continuing today, the Lebanese 
economy faces challenges with respect to (1) government-budget deficits, (2) current-account deficits, (3) high 
interest rates, and (4) high unemployment.   
 
 
Table 3:  Economic Growth in Lebanon 
Year GDP (Trillions of 
Lebanese 
Pounds) 
GDP (Equivalent 
in Billions of 
US$) 
Average 
Exchange Rate 
(Cost of US$ in 
LP) 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Inflation Rate 
(GDP Deflator) 
1991 4.1 4.5 928 38.2% 51.5% 
1992 9.5 5.5 1,713 4.5% 120.0% 
1993 13.1 7.5 1,741 7.0% 29.1% 
1994 15.3 9.1 1,680 8.0% 8.0% 
1995 18.0 11.1 1,621 6.5% 10.6% 
1996 20.4 13.0 1,571 4.0% 8.9% 
1997 22.9 14.8 1,539 4.0% 7.7% 
1998 24.5 16.2 1,516 3.0% 4.0% 
1999 24.8 16.4 1,508 1.0% 0.2% 
2000 24.8 16.4 1,508 0% 0% 
Source: Banque du Liban, "Financial Markets Handbook" 
 
 
Moreover, the Lebanese public infrastructure was badly damaged during the civil war. In the years following 
the conflict, the government incurred large capital expenditures, financed mainly by issuing treasury bills and notes 
rather than by taxes. Since 1994, deficits have been around LP 3 trillion (equivalent to US$2 billion) every year. Even 
though capital expenditures have been reduced, the government is making substantial interest payments on its 
accumulated debt.  The current net total debt
40
 of Lebanon exceeds 185 percent of the nation's gross domestic product.  
 
These large government borrowings have put substantial pressures on financial markets. To induce investors 
to buy treasury bills and notes, the Lebanese government offers high interest rates on its debt obligations. Table 4 
shows that the yield on three-month treasury bills has averaged 14.6 percent while the yield on two-year treasury notes 
has averaged 19.29 percent for the years 1993 to 2000.  The average rate on all treasury obligations has declined, 
                                                 
39
 It is assumed that the government fixes the interest rate on its bonds and the quantity of the bonds sold is then 
entirely determined by the non-bank private sector’s portfolio selection behavior.  
40
 Naïmy V. (2004). “A proposed Restricting of Lebanese Public Debt To Promote Economic Growth”. The 
International Business And Economics Research Journal, Volume 3, Number 8, p. 15-25 
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however, dropping from 21.4 percent in 1993 to 12.07 percent in 2000.  The combined effects of high interest rates, 
rising wages, and a currency that has risen vis-à-vis its major trading partners, has dampened real economic growth 
over the past few years. Although inflation has slowed down considerably, the economy is still experiencing 
substantial unemployment.  
 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Lebanese Pound (LP) / US Dollar Exchange Rates, 
Average Yields on Various Financial Instruments and Inflation Rates, 1993-2000 
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
LP/US$ Exchange Rate at end of year  1,711 1,647 1,596 1,552 1,527 1,508 1508 1508 
Average Rates on 3 months t-bills (in LP) %  18.70 15.09 18.88 15.19 13.42 12.70 11.57 10.88 
Average Rates on 6 months t-bills  (in LP) % 19.94 17.21 20.65 16.93 14.30 13.78 12.74 11.43 
Average Rates on 12 months t-bills (in LP) % 21.42 18.67 24.59 17.88 15.25 15.17 14.38 11.84 
Average Rates on 24 months t-bills (in LP) % 25.32 19.23 23.36 22.79 16.83 16.72 15.89 14.14 
Average Rate on T-bills (in LP)  % 21.35 17.55 21.87 18.2 14.95 14.59 13.65 12.07 
Average Rates On Bank Deposits in LP  % 12.78 13.16 15.14 14.71 12.68 12.97 11.94 10.68 
Average Discount and Loans Rates in LP % 28.53 23.88 24.52 25.21 20.29 20.24 19.48 18.15 
Spread Between Average Rates on t-bills and 
Rates on Deposits (in LP) % 
8.57 4.39 6.73 3.49 2.27 1.62 1.71 1.39 
Spread Between Average Rates on Discount 
and Loans and Average Rates on Deposits in 
LP % 
15.75 10.72 9.38 10.50 7.61 7.27 7.54 7.47 
Repo Rate  (in LP)  % 31.61 30.00 43.75 27.83 27.08 30.00 27.92 20.83 
Inter-Bank Rate in LP  %  6.60 7.33 34.88 11.19 13.00 11.23 7.46 7.58 
Average Discount and Loans Rates in US$  % NA NA 12.03 11.91 11.76 11.54 10.95 11.19 
Average Rates On Bank Deposits in US$   % NA NA 5.29 5.41 5.72 5.89 5.60 5.92 
Spread Between Average Rates on Discount 
and Loans and Average Rates on Bank 
Deposits in US$ % 
NA NA 6.74 6.5 6.04 5.65 5.35 5.27 
Rate of Inflation %  29.1 8.0 10.6 8.9 7.7 4.0 0.2 0.0 
Note:  A few outliers exist in the data. The average inter-bank rates were 275% and 43% in May and August, 1995, respectively. 
The average inter-bank rates were 45% and 36% in September 1997 and December 1998, respectively.  
Sources: Banque du Liban website, Banque du Liban, "Financial Markets Handbook" 
 
 
Lebanese banks offer loans and deposits denominated in US dollars (USD) as well as those denominated in 
Lebanese pounds. The average interest rates on USD loans and deposits are much lower than those denominated in 
LP. Table 4 shows the average USD loan and deposit rates for the years from 1995 to 2000.
41
  Rates on deposits 
ranged from 5.29 percent (1995) to 5.92 percent (2000) while loan rates ranged from 12.03 percent (1995) to 11.19 
percent (2000).  
 
Structure Of The Lebanese Interest Rates 
 
The above quoted interest rates are composed of a real risk-free rate, K*, plus several premiums that reflect 
inflation (IP), the riskiness of the asset (such as the default risk premium (DRP), the maturity risk premium, (MRP), 
and the security’s marketability (or liquidity, (LP))). This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
 
Quoted interest rate = K = K* + IP + DRP + LP + MRP 
 
Based on the above analysis regarding the Lebanese public debt, the public deficit, and the high levels of 
interest rates, we conclude that K* is virtual for the case of Lebanon. IP, DRP, LP, and MRP constitute the biggest 
share (more than 90%) of the nominal rates.  Estimating the sum of these premiums in Lebanon cannot be accurate 
                                                 
41
 The average interest rate on US dollar denominated loans and deposits were not available for 1993 and 1994. 
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giving the present volatile economic situation that may sharply vary from year to year
42. However, it’s clear that real 
interest rates are depressed (even if the public authorities claims the opposite) which in turn is affecting adversely the 
economic growth.  
 
Reserve And Liquidity Requirements 
 
Until September 2001, banks operating in Lebanon have been required to keep 13%
43
 of their deposits in LP 
as reserves with the Central Bank (Banque Du Liban, BDL). At the end of the same year, BDL increased the required 
reserve ratio to 25% of sight deposits denominated in LP and to 15% of time deposits
44
 denominated in LP. In 
addition, BDL has also introduced a new reserve required ratio of 15% on deposits
45
 denominated in US$
46
. Banks 
failing to keep such reserves will be obliged to call for and liquidate part of their loans and credits in order to attain the 
required reserves. Otherwise, they will be charged a penalty of 300% per anum of the value of the shortfall in the 
required reserves.  
 
Regarding liquidity requirements, lending limits are imposed on USD credits with a ceiling of 70% of USD 
deposits. The liquidity ratio is the share of liquid assets
47
 to deposits and other obligations
48
.  
 
Reserve and liquidity requirements in Lebanon are considered as a tax on financial intermediation, which 
widens the spread between deposit and loan interest rate and reduces the size of the financial system
49
. Hence, the 
abolition (or the decrease) of reserve requirements, by increasing the size of financial intermediation and removing the 
distortionary effects of the tax, is likely to result in a deeper financial system. This argument is implicitly based on the 
assumption that the Lebanese government revenue from reserve and liquidity requirements is used unproductively, to 
finance government consumption. If these resources are instead used to finance productive public investment, then 
this conclusion may not follow. Much of the literature on infrastructure demonstrates that investment in public capital 
has large positive effects on the productivity of private capital
50
. If this is the case, then reserve and liquidity 
requirements are likely to boost economic growth, thereby also likely to enhance financial development. Additionally, 
reserve and liquidity requirement policies, if applied properly, may have more direct effects on the development of the 
financial system by ensuring that banks are sufficiently liquid in order to be able to meet day-to-day withdrawals by 
depositors.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 As illustrated in table 3. 
43
 A minimum of 3% of deposits in the form of special Treasury bills remunerated at a rate of 6% and a minimum of 
10% as a non-interest bearing current account. 
44
 In December 2002, the BDL abolished interest paid on obligatory reserves exceeding 13%.  
45
 One of the prominent features of the Lebanese monetary economy is the strong dollarization of deposits and credits. 
The US dollar is taking the place in the collection of deposits and in the distribution of credit since the Lebanese 
pound was not, and is not filling its functions, mainly as a mean of payment or as a unit of account. This dollarization 
constitutes a serious brake to the financing of the growth and more closely, to the financing of the Lebanese industrial 
investment:  economic agents in need of financing are indeed victims of a severe credit crunch in Lebanese pounds.  
46
 The Central Bank Circulars: circular #1949 dated September 20, 2001.  
47
 Liquid assets = cash and deposits in the central bank + net deposits in banks + treasury bills + accrued interest 
receivables. 
The Central Bank circulars: circular # 1709, dated March 18, 1999.  
48
 Deposits and other obligations = deposits to clients + public sector and related parties + transfers + engagement by 
acceptance + accrued interest payable + other credit accounts.  
The Central Bank circulars: circular # 1709, dated March 18, 1999.  
49
 Fry M., (1995). Money, Interest and Banking in Economic Development. 2
nd
 edt. John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore MD 
50
 Aschauer D., (1989). “Is public expenditure productive?” Journal of Monetary Economics 23: 177-200 
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Supply Of Credits To The Private Sector And Interest Rates 
 
With respect to the above diagnosis regarding the financial policies (interest rate restraints, reserve, and 
liquidity requirements) applied in Lebanon, we can deduce that this country is not financially “liberalized”. In the first 
section of this paper, we tried to build a model that could fit the Lebanese limitations in order to measure the effects of 
financial liberalization on the supply of credit to the private sector. In this section, we will try to study the possibility 
of predicting these effects after adapting this model to the Lebanese equation.  
 
The complete model is solved to derive the following result
51
: 
 
dLp  =        ( 4 - 24) + 44(2+22)  ≷0                 (12) 
dim 1+ 43 (2+22) - (3 + 23)   
 
Assuming that inflation is constant, a change in im also reflects an equal change in the expected real rate on deposits, 
hence, the multiplier effect in (12) cannot be noticed. However, considering the case where the demand for 
government bonds remains constant, implying that 21 = ---- = 28 = 0, equation (12) is reduced to:  
 
dLp   =   4 + 2 44                      (13) 
 dim     1 + 2 43 - 3 
 
It is obvious that denominator of (13) is positive
52
. As for the numerator, 2 and 4 are positive, but in fact 
the sign of 44 is indeterminate. It depends on combinations of a negative substitution effect and a positive income 
effect. In this adapted model, assumed that the negative substitution effect exceeds the positive income effect (please 
refer to table 2), implying that C/im <0 or that S/im > 0. In this case, Lp/im > 0, suggesting that in the absence 
of government borrowing from the banking sector, financial liberalization (as defined here) leads to an increase in the 
supply of bank credit to the private sector.  
 
Conclusion 
 
If the government finances its budget deficits by borrowing from the banking sector, it is a priori not possible 
to predict the effect of financial liberalization of the supply of credit to the private sector.  In the absence of 
government borrowing from the banking sector, the effect is clearly determined, provided that consumption-saving is 
interest rate sensitive
53
 or the consumption-saving decision is exogenous and has no bearing on the portfolio selection. 
The effect in both cases is positive.  
 
Given the fact that the Lebanese government is highly depending on the banking sector to finance its growing 
deficit, the direct application of this model would not be able to predict the direct effects of the financial liberalization 
on the supply of credit to the private sector.  
 
In fact, the average loan-to-asset ratio of the Lebanese banks since 1995 is only 31 percent
54
. Unfortunately, 
cash and deposits with the BDL have tremendously increased in 2002. This increase isn’t but the consequence of the 
absorption of the liquidity in local currency by the BDL and the cash contribution of banks (at a 0% interest) to the 
financing of the Lebanese government in accordance with the decisions of Paris II. As a result, the share of loans 
                                                 
51
 See Gupta K. and Lensink R. (1996). 
52
 Under extreme conditions this may be negative; for example, if (1 + 2 43) < 3, in which case 3 will have to be 
sufficiently greater than unity, which is impossible.  
53
 In the conventional sense, i.e.,  C/im < 0 
54
 This ratio is unacceptable in the developed counties.  
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allocated to the private sector is decreasing annually on average by 28% since 2001, knowing that this decrease
55
 is 
not compensated via a direct financing through Beirut Stock Exchange market.  
 
 
Table 4:  Uses of Funds of Lebanese Commercial Banks 
In % of Total Assets 2001 2002 September 2003 
Cash & Deposits at BDL 14.8 15.1 28 
Claims on Resident Private Sector 30.9 28.8 25.9 
Claims on Public Sector 32.1 33.6 26.4 
Foreign Assets 18.1 18.1 15.7 
Fixed Assets & Other non-classified Assets 4.1 4.4 4.0 
Source: Association of Banks in Lebanon, Annual Report, 2001-2002 
 
 
Illustrating the Crowding Out Effects 
 
In order to measure the crowding out effect due to the continuous government borrowing from the banking 
sector, we will identify first the relationship between the money supplied to the private sector and the interest rates.  
 
Based on the monthly data
56
 covering the years 1995
57
-2002 (96 observations), the relationship between the 
money supplied to the private sector, MSPS, and the interest rates, I, (weighted average lending rate allocated by the 
commercial banks), is illustrated in the following equation: 
 
MSPS = 82500.3
58
 – 5198.5 I                    (A) 
R = 0.928 and ARS = 0.859 
 
With respect to equation (1), we are able to identify the equilibrium levels of interest rates that correspond to 
the MSPS at the end of each period. Each equilibrium level represents the intersection between the supply of and the 
demand for money to the private sector. Assuming in this case that for each equilibrium level the MSPS is inelastic
59
, 
we should be able to deduce the demand function for money of the private sector, DMPS, where DMPS = a + bI. By 
substituting DMPS with the quantity of money where DMPS = MSPS, and “I” with their corresponding equilibrium 
levels, we can find the two parameters a and b.  Consequently,  
 
DMPS = 92710.84 – 6024.1 I                    (B) 
 
In a second step, we will determine the demand for money of the public sector in order to compare it with 
equation (2).  The same methodology will be applied but instead, we will first, identify the relationship between the 
money supplied to the public sector, MSPub, and the interest rates served on TBs, and secondly, deduce the demand 
for money of the public sector, DMPub.  
 
Based on the monthly data
60
 covering the years 1993-2002 (120 observations), the relationship between the 
MSPub and the interest rates served on TBs, Ipub, (weighted average interest rates on TBs) is illustrated in the 
following equation: 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Naimy V., (2004). “Overall Lebanese Banks’ Performance: A Risk Return Framework”, The International Business 
And Economics Research Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, January, p. 1-10. 
56
 Provided by the BDL and by the Ministry of Finance 
57
 The years 1993 and 1994 are not covered because of the absence of official data concerning USD lending rates.  
58
 For the quantity of money, figures are in billion of LP and for Article I, figures are in percentage.  
59
 This restriction will allow us to determine the “forced” demand for credit of the PS. 
60
 Provided by the BDL and by the Ministry of Finance 
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Ipub = 24.652 – 5E
-04
MSPub                    (C) 
R = 0.911 and ARS = 0.84 
 
Following the same methodology as above: 
 
DMPub = 49304 – 2000Ipub                    (D) 
 
The below figure compares the price that each sector was willing to pay to receive the same amount of credit, 
say the stock of the money supply available at the end of each period from 1993 through 2002.  
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The high price that the private sector was willing to pay in order to have access to funds shows how much 
this sector is in need for financing and how much the government is having recourse to this fund to the detriment of 
the private sector.  Lebanese banks appear like intermediary transferring deposits in LP and in USD to the public 
sector to finance an intolerable public deficit absorbing a fundamental part of the local financial resources. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper provides a systematic analysis of financial liberalization. A theoretical, adapted, and integrated 
model of portfolio decision-making and consumption-saving decision is conceived. This model constitutes a good 
foundation for future work dealing with financial liberalization and private investment and also with banking 
efficiency.  It could be slightly modified to fit the constraints of any other developing country. In the case of Lebanon, 
the effect of financial liberalization cannot be accurately determined since the government is borrowing from the 
banking sector to off-set its budget deficits. Our findings demonstrate that financial liberalization is a much more 
complex process than has been assumed by earlier literature and its effects on the supply of credit to the private sector, 
on investment, and consequently on financial development are ambiguous. However, we were able to deduce the 
demand for money of the public and private sectors (under restrictive hypothesis) in order to illustrate the crowding 
out effects. The Lebanese government is financing its huge budget deficits through the sale of bonds to commercial 
banks. Therefore, these banks start rationing the available credit, where the private demand for loanable funds greatly 
exceeds the available supply. This situation is extremely damaging the financial and economic development of 
Lebanon. A drastic adjustment is urgently required via the adoption of a set of reforms dealing particularly with the 
implementation of a new structure of interest rates, a realistic exchange rate, and a fundamental change of the fiscal 
policy.  
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